文章摘要
闵杰,常远.推广者影响力异质下平台零售商的 双渠道推广策略研究[J].安徽建筑大学学报,2023,31():
推广者影响力异质下平台零售商的 双渠道推广策略研究
Research on Promotion Strategy of Platform Retailer under Heterogeneous Promoters’ Influence
投稿时间:2022-11-17  修订日期:2022-12-17
DOI:
中文关键词: 双渠道推广  社交平台  Stackelberg博弈
英文关键词: dual channel promotion  social platform  Stackelberg game
基金项目:基于购物体验竞争的多渠道供应链决策与协调机制研究
作者单位E-mail
闵杰* 安徽建筑大学 minjie@ahjzu.edu.cn 
常远 安徽建筑大学  
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中文摘要:
      在平台零售商与两位推广者组成的双渠道推广供应链中,考虑推广者们对消费者具有异质影响力,构建了由平台零售商主导的推广策略选择与定价博弈模型。根据平台零售商与两位推广者是否签订激励合约分为四种推广策略:NN策略、IN策略、NI策略、II策略。研究了四种策略下平台零售商的定价行为与推广者的推广努力行为,分析了努力效用系数、努力成本、激励系数对平台零售商的策略选择影响。研究发现:(1)对推广效果较好的产品,与影响力较低的推广者签订激励合约是平台零售商的较优选择;(2)较高的推广成本会降低推广者付出的推广努力;(3)对推广者的激励不总是对平台零售商有利的。
英文摘要:
      In the two-channel promotion supply chain composed of the platform retailer and two promoters, considering that promoters have heterogeneous influence on consumers, a game model of promotion strategy selection and pricing led by platform retailer is constructed. According to whether the platform retailer and two promoters sign incentive contracts, there are four promotion strategies: NN strategy, IN strategy, NI strategy and II strategy. This paper studies the pricing behavior of the platform retailer and the promotion effort behavior of promoters under four strategies, and analyzes the influence of effort utility coefficient, effort cost and incentive coefficient on the strategy choice of platform retailer. The findings are as follows: (1) For products with good promotion effect, it is better for the platform retailer to sign incentive contract with the promoter who has smaller influence; (2) Higher promotion cost will reduce the promotion effort paid by promoters; (3) Incentives for promoters are not always good for the platform retailer.
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