文章摘要
闵杰,宋广月,曹宗宏,欧剑.非对称制造商竞争下零售商信息共享策略研究[J].安徽建筑大学学报,2021,29():
非对称制造商竞争下零售商信息共享策略研究
Research on the Demand Information Sharing Strategy of Retailers under Asymmetric Manufacturer Competition
投稿时间:2020-11-05  修订日期:2020-12-11
DOI:
中文关键词: 信息共享  非对称竞争  Stackelberg博弈
英文关键词: information sharing  asymmetric competition  Stackelberg game
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571002,71771003);安徽省学术和技术带头人及后备人选科研活动经费资助项目(2018H183);安徽省自然科学基金项目(1908085MG228);安徽建筑大学博士启动资金(2019QDZ04);安徽省高校优秀拔尖人才培育资助项目(gxyqZD2019058);安徽省高校人文社会科学研究一般项目(SK2018JD16)
作者单位E-mail
闵杰 安徽建筑大学数理学院 minjie@ahjzu.edu.cn 
宋广月 安徽建筑大学数理学院  
曹宗宏* 安徽建筑大学数理学院 caozh666@sina.com 
欧剑 安徽建筑大学  
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中文摘要:
      研究了一个零售商在强势品牌制造商与弱势普通制造商非对称竞争下的需求信息共享策略问题。假设零售商先决定是否向全部或某个制造商共享需求信息,随后品牌制造商和普通制造商先后决策各自批发价,最后零售商决策订购数量,探讨了四种信息共享策略下零售商以及两个竞争制造商的利润。结果表明:当普通产品不能完全替代品牌产品时,零售商的最优策略为不向两个制造商共享需求信息;如果需要共享信息给制造商,那么仅会向后决策的制造商共享需求信息;此外,零售商的利润随着普通产品与品牌产品差异性的减小而增大。
英文摘要:
      Study a retailer's demand information sharing strategy under the competition between a strong brand manufacturer and a weak ordinary manufacturer. Assuming that the retailer first decides whether to share demand information with all or a certain manufacturer, then the brand manufacturer and the ordinary manufacturer successively decide their respective wholesale prices, and finally the retailer decides the order quantity, discussed the profits of retailers and two competing manufacturers under four information sharing strategies. The results show that when ordinary products cannot completely replace brand products, the retailer’s optimal information sharing strategy is not to share demand information with two manufacturers. If the retailer needs to share demand information, it will only share demand information with manufacturers who decide the wholesale price later. Retailers' profits increase as the difference in the substitution rate between ordinary products and brand products decreases.
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